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INTRODUCTION
Shale gas is an unconventional form of gas1 because its extraction is more difficult or
less economical than that of conventional natural gas. It has become an important
item of energy policy during the last years since new processes have allowed its
extraction. In the medium term, shale gas should foster a reinforcement of the gas
part in the world’s energy mix. In 2011, the IEA released an influential report entitled
“Are we entering a golden age of gas?” This report suggests that shale gas could help
substantially boost global gas use.2 It also warns at the same time that this success
could bring into question the international goal of limiting the long-term increase in
the global temperature to 2° C above pre-industrial levels.
In the world economy, the impact of shale gas is increasing rapidly (especially in the
USA, albeit apparently not as significantly as expected3). In the EU, its perspectives
remain uncertain, for many reasons. Estimates are not reliable. Shale gas exploita-
tion remains a controversial issue due to geology, lack of infrastructure and also fears
for the environment and public health. The EU institutions seem to have a favorable
attitude towards shale gas development while the Member States’ attitude seems to
vary from enthusiasm to hesitation or opposition. Public opinion on the issue
appears quite divided everywhere.
This brief paper will examine various estimations of potential resources in the EU
(§ 1), the potential costs and benefits (§ 2), the initiatives taken by the EU institutions
(§ 3) and the national authorities (§ 4), and finally the emerging EU framework (§ 5).
The conclusion is, rather surprisingly, that whatever happens on this front, this will
not modify the present structural challenges of the EU in the domains of climate and
energy.4
Tania Zgajewski5
1 Unconventional gas is the collective term used to describe “tight gas”, “shale gas” and/or “coal bed meth-
ane”.
2 Thereafter, the IEA’s medium-term gas market report released in July 2013 confirmed it.
3 See T. Spencer, O. Sartor, Mathilde Mathieu, Unconventional wisdom: an economic analysis of US shale gas
and implications for the EU, IDRI, Policy Brief, No 05/14 February 2014 (http://www.iddri.org/Publications/
Collections/Syntheses/PB0514.pdf). See also a paper made by the Energy Modeling Forum (Stanford Uni-
versity) entitled “Changing the game?: emissions and market implications of new natural gas supplies”,
EMF Report 26, Volume I, September 2013, Stanford University (http://emf.stanford.edu).
4 The relevant documents used in this paper stop on 11 March 2014.
5 Tania Zgajewski is a Senior Research Fellow at Egmont and a member of the board of HERA/CEEI. She
worked as a consultant for the European Commission and has long been a Research Fellow at the University
of Liège.3

§ 1. VARIOUS EUROPEAN RESERVES’ ESTIMATES
In the EU, sizeable quantities of shale gas (though generally smaller than in the
United States) have been reported in several countries (Poland, Germany, France,
Austria, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Hungary, Romania, UK, Ireland,
Portugal, Spain, Italy) and exploration activity is occurring in several of them.
More precisely, according to a 2011 study by the US Energy Information Administra-
tion, the largest estimated reserves of shale gas in Europe are in Poland with 187
trillion cubic feet (5.3 trillion cubic meters) which equates to 29% of the European
total but less than 3% of global shale gas reserves. This estimate has been reviewed
in 2013 and lowered by the US Energy Information Administration to 148 trillion
cubic feet.6 In its own study published in 20127, and well below the US estimate,
Poland has pegged its recoverable shale gas reserves at 346-768 billion cubic meters.
Poland is expected to publish a new study on the country’s shale gas reserves in
2014. France has also estimated resources of 180 trillion cubic feet (5.0 trillion cubic
meters) lowered also in 2013 by the US Energy Information Administration to 137
trillion cubic feet.8 For these two countries, shale gas is or could be a fantastic oppor-
tunity when one knows that Poland’s energy system importantly relies on fossil fuel
(particularly coal which is a big source of GHG emissions) while France’s energy
system importantly relies on nuclear energy which, after the Fukushima accident in
Japan in 2011 and the issue of nuclear waste, raises in a way or another the question
of its long-term future. In Spain, the size of the opportunity seems important too and
amounts, depending on the source, between 2.05 trillion cubic meters9 (80% of
these would be found in the shale rock) to about 50 trillion cubic feet10 trapped in
shale rock. Germany and the United-Kingdom have also significant shale gas reserves
but here too figures are uncertain.
These few examples show the difficulties to estimate the volume of shale gas
reserves. The latter in addition must be technically and economically recoverable. It
is thus very difficult to know the shale gas production potential for Europe. Numbers
are cited but they are so far guesses.
6 Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: An Assessment of 137 Shale Formations in 41
Countries Outside the United States, EIA, June 2013 (http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/).
7 The study was made by Poland’s geological institute.
8 Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: An Assessment of 137 Shale Formations in 41
Countries Outside the United States, EIA, June 2013 (http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/).
9 Estimates by the Spanish Association of Companies in Investigation, Exploration & Production of Hydrocar-
bons and Underground Storage.
10 Estimates by the nation’s Council of Mining Engineers.5

§ 2. OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS FOR THE 
EUROPEAN UNION
2.1. Opportunities
2.1.1. Easier decarbonisation
The EU is committed to reduce its GHG emissions to at least 80% below 1990 level by
2050. In December 2011, the EU issued its energy roadmap for 205011. The latter
presents various routes towards decarbonisation of the EU energy systems,
combining 4 main options: energy efficiency, renewable energy, nuclear and carbon
capture and storage (hereafter “CCS”).
Within this framework, the key role of gas as a transitional source of energy is also
confirmed. Gas could become a low-carbon technology if CCS becomes, commer-
cially available on a large-scale basis.12
But will shale gas reduce GHG emissions as the EU seems to believe? This is not sure.
A Cornell University study13 concludes that shale gas is not a viable “bridge” to a low-
carbon future. According to this study, methane14 produced from shale gas has a large
or even larger “greenhouse gas footprint “ than coal (a fossil fuel that we have no
intention to stop the use15). Industry and some academics have branded those find-
ings as exaggerated, but the debate has been marked by a limitation of the publicly
available data.16 According to the Scottish Widows Investment Partnership’s report,
the climate impact of shale gas could be partially minimized if companies use a tech-
11 Commission communication entitled “A roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in
2050” – COM(2011) 112.
12 It should be noted that the EU is currently lagging behind in the development of CCS compared to other
parts of the worlds (USA and Asia). For that reason, the EU should launch a set of proposals to address the
slow development and funding problems of CCS. See the Commission’s consultative communication on the
future of carbon capture and storage in Europe – COM (2013) 180, in particular pp. 16-19. The responses to
this consultation should feed the European Commission’s work on the 2030 Energy and Climate Frame-
work. See also the 2012 report entitled “ European Carbon and Capture Storage Demonstration Project
Network – Situation report 2012” (http://cdn.globalccsinstitute.com/sites/default/files/publications/
115876/network-situation-report-2012.pdf) as well as the 2013 paper prepared by S. Tindale, Centre for
European Reform, entitled “Europe should regulate to promote carbon capture and storage” (http://
www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2013/pb_sct_ccs_30oct13-8032.pdf).
13 R. W. Howarth, R. Santoro, A. Ingraffea, Methane and the greenhouse-gas footprint of natural gas from
shale formations, Journal Climatic change Letters, DOI 10.1007/s10584-011-0061-5 (2011).
14 Methane is a greenhouse gas that remains in the atmosphere for approximately 9-15 years and is over 20
times more effective in trapping heat in the atmosphere than carbon dioxide (CO2).
15 See IEA’s latest medium-term coal market report issued in 2013 which projects coal growth to continue, a
resilient trend during the last decade. According to this report, coal demand will grow at an average rate of
2.3% per year through 2018.
16 See for instance two articles published shortly after the Cornell University Study which addressed the same
question but arrived at lower leakage rates and impacts. The first one: Mohane Jiang et al, “Life cycle green-
house emissions of Marcellus shale gas”, Carnegie Mellon University, Environmental Research Letters 6, n°
3 (2011). The second one is an official comment submitted by another Cornell professor: Lawrence M. Cath-
les III, “A commentary on “The greenhouse gas footprint of natural gas in shale formations by R.W.
Howarth, R. Santoro, and Anthony Ingraffea”“, Climatic Change 113, n° 2 (2012): 525-535.7
SHALE GAS IN EUROPE: MUCH ADO ABOUT LITTLE?nology known as “green completion” (also called “reduced emission completion”) to
capture the methane that comes up with hydraulic fracturing flowback.17 But the vast
majority of shale gas companies do not use this technology because it costs money.
It is worth noting that methane emissions have meanwhile received increased atten-
tion in the US with the following result. Since 2013, the US gas industry is required to
use the “green completion” technology, with a transitory period to ensure that green
completion equipment is broadly available.18 During this transition period that ends
1 January 2015, the gas industry has the option to flare instead. This new obligation
has been criticized by industry and environmentalists alike.19
2.1.2. Reduced external dependency
The EU becomes more dependent20 from the outside world regarding its primary
energy supply. 21The EU is also the world largest energy importer. As such, the EU is
likely to be more vulnerable to supply risks as a result. This is particularly true consid-
ering that developing Asian countries and the Middle East now account for most of
the growth in global energy demand. And it was made particularly blatant by the
Russia-Ukraine gas dispute in 2009. That year, Russia cut off gas shipments via
Ukraine for nearly two weeks amid a price and payment dispute, and more than 15
European countries scrambled to find alternative sources of energy. The current
Russian-Ukrainian conflict stemming from, on the one hand, the Ukrainian ex-Presi-
dent’s rejection of a single economic deal with the European Union regarding an
association agreement and, on the other hand, the fact that Russian forces took
control of Ukraine’s Crimea region, once again highlights the EU vulnerability.22
17 http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/may/29/shale-gas-coal-climate-investor?fb=optOut and
http://dontfrackwithny.com/golden-age-of-fracked-gas-may-mean-dark-ages-for-climate/. It should be
noted that Scottish Widows Investment Partnership is one of the biggest shareholder in BP, as well as other
major oil and gas companies. A recent study by David T. Allen et al. entitled “Measurements of methane
emissions at natural gas production sites in the United States”, University of Texas at Austin, September
2013 confirms that almost all the escaping methane could be captured by state of the art equipment. The
study relied on data from 9 major companies. It can be found on the following website: http://
www.pnas.org/content/110/44/17768.full.pdf+html?with-ds=yes and the abstract of the study can be
found on http://www.utexas.edu/news/2013/09/16/understanding-methane-emissions/. This study has
already been criticized (http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/experts-fracking-methane-leakage-
study-financed-by-gas-industry-with-partner-edf-is-deeply-flawed-224092801.html).
18 http://www.epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/actions.html
19 For more information on green completion, see http://watchlist.vermontlaw.edu/fracking-and-%E2%80%
98green-completion%E2%80%99-still-incomplete/; https://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=
117050; and http://www.epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/pdfs/20120417changes.pdf.
20 Gross inland energy consumption in the EU27 reached a level of 1700 million tonnes of oil equivalent in
2011. This represents a decrease of 6% compared to 2008 because of the economic slowdown. Energy
dependence rate was 54% in the EU27, nearly stable to 2008. These figures have been issued by Eurostat
(STAT/13/23 dated 13.02.2013).
21 According to EU Commissioner for energy, G. Oettinger, the EU gas production could decrease by 31%
between now and 2030 and the result is that the EU’s dependence on gas imports could increase from 63%
in 2010 to 73% in 2030. See Speech/13/642 of 17.07.2013 in the framework of “A transatlantic Energy Rev-
olution: Europe’s Energy Diversification and US Unconventional Oil and Gas”.
22 See an Article published on 8 March 2013 in Euractiv (http://www.euractiv.com/central-europe/gas-
remains-russia-key-card-euro-news-533930).8
SHALE GAS IN EUROPE: MUCH ADO ABOUT LITTLE?Within the EU, domestic gas production is falling and there is increasing reliance on
imports from outside the EU. The demand for gas within the EU is continuing to rise,
particularly as the preferred transitional fuel for power generation. But will shale gas
production in the EU have a major influence to reverse the declining European gas
production and the rising import dependency? Here too, nothing is sure. A report
requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Environment, Public Health
and Food Safety (ENVI) published in June 201123 concludes that even an aggressive
development of shale gas production in Europe would have a marginal influence.
However, the report does not exclude that shale gas might play a significant role at
regional level (overall, in Poland which have large shale gas reserves). A very recent
report24 from IDDRI confirms that analysis.
2.1.3. Reduced gas prices
More gas in market economies could mean cheaper gas. However, shale gas prices
in Europe are expected to be higher than in the US due to a number of differences.
Firstly, European geology is less favorable. Most of the European fields are deeper
underground than in the US and shale gas would be harder to extract. Secondly, the
US has a huge and very experienced land-based drilling industry, and competition
drives down costs. That is not the case in Europe. Thirdly, the US has many existing
pipelines, enabling drilling companies to get the gas to market, whereas Europe has
no such comparable network. Fourthly, Europe will likely impose tighter regulation
on the industry than the US, where arguably a wild-west mentality is still evident to
some extent25. Fifthly, the current construction and drilling costs of a shale gas well
are also significantly cheaper in the United States than in other developed coun-
tries.26 The IEA’s Energy Outlook 2013 shares this analysis. According to the IEA, Japa-
nese and European gas and electricity are expected to be twice as high as in the US
by 2035.
23 See for precise figures, the document requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Environment,
Public Health and Food safety entitled “Impacts of shale gas and shale oil extraction on the environment
and on human health”, Directorate General for Internal Policies – Policy Department A: Economic and Sci-
entific Policy-, PE 464.425, June 2011, pp. 74-76.
24 See T. Spencer, O. Sartor, Mathilde Mathieu, Unconventional wisdom: an economic analysis of US shale gas
and implications for the EU, IDRI, Policy Brief, No 05/14 February 2014, p. 4. (http://www.iddri.org/Publica-
tions/Collections/Syntheses/PB0514.pdf).
25 See The Economist, 26 November 2011. See also “A Slow Costly Road to Nowhere: Shale Gas Development
in Europe” (http://www.bund.net/fileadmin/bundnet/pdfs/klima_und_energie/130614_bund_klima_ener-
gie_wirtschaftlichkeit_fracking_foee.pdf). See also D. Buchan, Can shale gas transform Europe’s energy
landscape, Centre for European Reform, July 2013. Even senior EU official, Robin Miege, Director of strategy
at the European Commission’s DG Environment, poured in June 2013 cold water on claims that a shale gas
boom in Europe would result in low gas prices. According to this senior EU official, the possible benefits of
European shale gas production would more likely come in the form of diversification of the EU’s energy mix,
and in more energy security, or in the potential to renegotiate with the main gas suppliers, but “the effect
on prices is not necessarily going to be major”.
26 D. Hastings Dunn and M. J.L. McClelland, Shale gas and the revival of American power: debunking decline?,
International Affairs, Vol. 89, Issue 6, 2013, p. 1423. See Pavol Szalai, Révolution du gaz de schiste: peut-elle
traverser l’Atlantique?, Question d’Europe, n° 293, Fondation Robert Schuman, 4 novembre 2013, p. 5.9
SHALE GAS IN EUROPE: MUCH ADO ABOUT LITTLE?Yet, some analyses27 consider that the developments of shale gas projects in Europe
could at least contribute to lowering its gas prices and ensuring this way its intensive
industrial sectors keep their competitive levels, notably vis-à-vis their US counter-
parts. Linking shale gas with lower gas prices and EU industry competitiveness
appears rather simplistic. There are other elements to be taken into account. In addi-
tion, these benefits of shale gas production in Europe will depend on it being at least
as cheap as gas imported. It will not be easy to do that. Indeed, at the moment, half
of the gas (mostly Russian) that Europe consumes is sold on long-term contracts
indexed to the oil price, which remains high. This expensive gas is losing market share
not only to imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) but also to coal (especially from the
US, where coal has been pushed out of the domestic market into Europe by the
shale-induced drop in the US gas price). In addition, in the EU markets where renew-
ables account for a high share of total energy generation (like Germany or Spain), the
average utilization of gas-fired plants has dropped to a very low level.28 All these
elements if persistent should put downward pressure on gas prices.
Finally, experts also agree that even modest amounts of shale gas will not be
produced in Europe unless supported from public subsidies.29
So will shale gas produced in Europe be profitable from an economic point of view?
It will depend mainly on the adjustment of several factors: (1) the evolution of
demand; (2) the price of imported gas; and (3) the future development of LNG
exports to the EU.
2.2. Threats
Gas drilling and hydraulic fracturing are not risk free and they have raised public
attention on a number of concerns. The main ones are related to:
• the depth and construction of numerous wells, the area of surface land affected
and heavy truck traffic;
27 See for instance, a November 2013 report to the International Association of oil and gas producers (OGP)
entitled “Macroeconomic effects of European shale gas production” to be found on the following website:
(http://www.poyry.co.uk/sites/poyry.co.uk/files/public_report_ogp__v5_0.pdf). According to this report, a
thriving European shale gas industry could help limit energy bills rises by the middle of the century. See also
a May 2013 A.T. Kearney study on shale gas production in Europeç http://www.atkearney.com.tr/news-
media/news-releases/news-release/-/asset_publisher/00OIL7Jc67KL/content/new-a-t-%C2%A0kearney-
study-on-shale-gas-production-in-europe). According to this study, expectations are that the price of gas
will fall by up to six percent. If the regulatory, environmental, technological and economic circumstances
can be optimized, production volumes will potentially be even greater.
28 See D. Buchan, Can Shale gas transform Europe’s energy landscape, Centre for European Reform, July 2013,
p. 5.
29 Friends of the Earth Europe, Extractive industries: blessing or curse? – A slow costly road to nowhere: shale
gas development in Europe, May 2013, p. 3 (https://www.global2000.at/sites/global/files/Fact_Sheet_-_
Myths_of_the_European_Shale_Gas_Market_Final_0.pdf).10
SHALE GAS IN EUROPE: MUCH ADO ABOUT LITTLE?• mistakes or accidents in the drilling process (like casing failures or poor cement
jobs or spills on the surface of fracturing fluids) which can provoke soil and/or
water pollution;
• methane gas leakage from shale gas drilling and hydraulic fracturing which can
damage the air quality but also contaminate groundwater and drinking water;
• air emissions of volatile organic compounds, oxides of nitrogen and particulate
matter, as well as noise, from pumps and compressors needed to render the
produced gas up to the surface;
• the non-disclosure to the public (trade secrets) of the cocktail of chemicals used
during the fracking process when one knows this cocktail includes toxic, aller-
genic, mutagenic and carcinogenic substances. This cocktail of chemicals can also
provoke soil and/or groundwater pollution in case of leakage and there is here
clearly a public health challenge;30
• the rise of seismic activities linked to the practice of hydraulic fracturing and the
associated wastewater disposal;31
• the vast quantities of potable water needed for fracking creating, on the one
hand, pressure particularly in regions suffering from water scarcity and reduce
drinking water supply and, on the other hand, a risk of dramatic rise of water
price (like it is happening in the US in certain states where the shale gas industry
is in competition with the agricultural industry to buy water);32, 33
• the radioactivity which comes from the rocks in depth;
• the potential damages to the tourist industry.
30 For instance, a February 2013 study by Lisa M. McKenzie et al. (NIH) entitled “Birth Outcomes and Maternal
Residential Proximity to Natural Gas Development in Rural Colorado” cautiously suggests that the density
and proximity of natural gas wells within 10 mile-radius of maternal residence would slightly increase –
about 30% – the risk of heart defects of the newborn child. The Abstract of the study can be found on the
following website: http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/122/1/ehp.1306722.pdf.
31 The latest evidence comes in the form of an article in the 26 March 2013 issue of “Geology”, a publication
of the Geological Society of America. Entitled “Potentially induced earthquakes in Oklahoma, USA: Links
between wastewater injection and the 2011 Mw. 5.7 earthquake sequence”, this study was coauthored by
University of Oklahoma Geophysics Professor Katie Keranen; U.S. Geological Survey geophysicist Dr. Eliza-
beth Cochran; Columbia University’s Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory’s seismologist Dr. Heather Savage
and Dr. Geoffrey Abers. The study concluded that there is a strong likelihood that the largest recorded
earthquake in Oklahoma history (November 2011) was triggered by wastewater injection that follows frack-
ing. The study also shows that it can take decades for an injection well to spark an earthquake. Some state-
government experts remain skeptical towards the study’s findings while the hydrocarbon industry ignore
them. Yet, a previous American report published in June 2012 by the National Academy of Science (USA)
and entitled “Induced seismicity potential in energy technologies” also found that the energy industry may
be increasing the risk of earthquakes by injecting wastewater underground.
32 It should be noted that in its World Energy Outlook 2012, the IEA concludes that fresh water use is becom-
ing an increasingly crucial issue for energy production around the world. It projects that the amount of
fresh water consumed for world energy production is on track to double within the next 25 years. Accord-
ing to the IEA however, the future impact of fracking should be “relatively” small compared to the one of
biofuel production and coal-fired electricity which will drive the largest shares of water consumption. Not
everyone agrees with these projections.
33 See also an article published on 5 February 2014 in the newspaper, The Guardian, entitled “Fracking is
depleting water supplies in America’s driest areas”.11
SHALE GAS IN EUROPE: MUCH ADO ABOUT LITTLE?The US is the only country where horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing have
been applied increasingly at large scale since many decades. Based on information
from the US experience, EU civil society groups34 warn that these techniques have
already had negative impacts on the environment and human health. They also
argue that shale gas development will keep the EU dependent on fossil fuels for a
longer time and will slow down the large-scale deployment of clean energy renewa-
bles and energy savings. They call on Member States to suspend ongoing activities,
to abrogate permits and to place a ban on any new projects. They also urge the EU
institutions not to promote further the development of shale gas.
It should be noted that hydraulic fracturing is now controversially discussed in the
USA.35 People are becoming aware of it as drilling sites move to more densely popu-
lated areas.
34 See for instance, the position of Friends of the Earth Europe in two papers respectively entitled “Shale Gas:
Unconventional and Unwanted” and “Shale Gas: Debunking Economic Myths” (http://www.foeeurope.org/
shale-gas) or the June 2013 WWF position on shale gas in the EU – Keep Pandora’s box firmly shut (http://
awsassets.panda.org/downloads/wwf_shale_gas_position.pdf).
35 See among others an October 2013 report entitled “Fracking by the numbers – Key impacts of dirty drilling
at the state and national level”, prepared by E. Ridelington and J. Rumpler, Environment America, Research
and Policy Centre (http://www.environmentamerica.org/sites/environment/files/reports/EA_Fracking-
Numbers_scrn.pdf).12
§ 3. THE VARIOUS INITIATIVES OF THE 
EU INSTITUTIONS
Various concerns exist and it is thus important to determine whether the European
legislation is sufficient to allow potential investments, ensure the safety of the envi-
ronment and protect the health of its citizens during the extraction of shale gas.
3.1. The Commission
To get a better view on whether the current EU regulatory framework sufficiently
covers the risks associated with shale gas activities, the Commission has ordered
several studies.
According to the results of a legal study36, the existing EU regulation framework is
adequate for shale gas activities as they currently stand (stage of early exploration).
The study enumerates examples.37 For instance, authorization for exploration and
production is covered by the Hydrocarbon directive38; water protection by the water
framework directive39, the groundwater directive40 and the mining waste directive41;
operators’ liability for damages by the environmental liability directive42; the use of
chemicals by the REACH regulation43 administered by ECHA; the availability on the
market and use of biocidal products by the biocidal products regulation44. Public
access to environmental information as well as the requirement for an environ-
mental impact assessment are covered by general legislation (the legislation imple-
menting the Aarhus Convention45 and the codified environmental impact assess-
36 Final Report on Unconventional Gas in Europe, 8 November 2011, prepared by law firm Philippe & Partners.
37 See p. 101 of the 2011 report for the full list.
38 Directive 94/22/EC on conditions for granting and using authorizations for the prospection, exploration and
production of hydrocarbons (OJ 1994, L 164/3).
39 Directive 2000/60/EC establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy (OJ 2000, L
327/1).
40 Directive 2006/118/EC on the protection of groundwater against pollution and deterioration (OJ 2006, L
372/19).
41 Directive 2006/21/EC on the management of waste from extractive industries and amending Directive
2004/35/EC (OJ 2006, L 102/15).
42 Directive 2004/35/EC on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environ-
mental damage (OJ 2004, L 143/56).
43 Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 concerning the registration, evaluation, authorization and restriction of
chemicals (REACH), establishing a European chemicals agency, amending Directive 1999/45/EC and repeal-
ing Council regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and Commission regulation (EC) No 1488/94 as well as Council direc-
tive 76/769/EEC and Commission directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC and 2000/21/EC (OJ 2006, L 396/1).
44 Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 concerning the making available on the market and the use of biocidal prod-
ucts (OJ 2012, L 167/1).
45 The numerous legislative texts implementing the Aarhus Convention can be found on the following web-
site: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/legislation.htm. See also the last Commission’s report on
the implementation of the Aarhus Convention – COM (2011) 208.13
SHALE GAS IN EUROPE: MUCH ADO ABOUT LITTLE?ment directive46). The study recognizes however that the EU legislative framework
might be reviewed as shall gas projects develops into a larger scale operation. It also
confirms that most of the directives have been implemented into national law of the
countries which were scrutinized. In the rare case of non-implementation, other
national regulations exist governing the concerned activity or transposition is immi-
nent.
The Commission seems to agree with the study’s results. EU Energy Commissioner,
Günther Oettinger, for example, expressed a very positive attitude towards shale
gas. Speaking at an energy conference in Brussels on 17 July 2012, he argued that
since the US used shale gas to reduce its dependence on cheap imports from Qatar
and Nigeria, they now pay roughly 30% of the European gas price. He added “we are
not really active in looking at which risks and options we would have with shale gas”.
His objective here was that access to shale gas could help EU energy prices come
down and this would be favorable for the EU industrial production (which fell from
22% in 2000 to 18% in 2010). With the launching on 27 March 2013 of the Green
Paper setting out Europe’s energy and climate aims for 203047, Oettinger reiterated
his favourable position on shale gas. This green paper explicitly underlines “.. a need
to enable the future exploitation of indigenous oil and gas resources, both conven-
tional and unconventional in an environmentally safe manner, …”.48 Overall,
Oettinger’s positive attitude towards shale gas does not seem to meet an unfavour-
able tone from other commissioners.
Six other studies already published have offered more information to the Commis-
sion. The first one49 shows that extracting shale gas generally imposes a larger envi-
ronmental footprint than conventional gas development. Risks of surface and ground
water contamination, water resource depletion, air and noise emissions, land take,
disturbance to biodiversity and impacts related to traffic are deemed to be high in
the case of cumulative projects. The second one50 shows that shale gas produced in
the EU causes more GHG emissions than conventional natural gas produced in the
EU, but – if well managed – less than imported gas from outside the EU (Russia and
Algeria). Conversely, if not well managed, shale gas produced in the EU could cause
more GHG emissions than imported gas outside the EU. The third one51 shows that
46 Codified directive 2011/92/EU (OJ 28 January 2012, L 26/1). Amendments to this directive have been tabled
by the Commission in its communication COM (2012) 628. The revision aims at establishing a framework
that allows projects to be developed under the “best possible” environmental conditions. These amend-
ments are awaiting European Parliament’s first reading to be held on 12.03.2014.
47 Green paper: A 2030 framework for climate and energy policies – COM(2013) 169.
48 COM (2013) 169, p. 11.
49 A DG ENVI study on the identification of potential risks for the environment and human health arising from
hydrocarbons operations involving hydraulic fracturing in Europe. This study was undertaken by AEA Tech-
nology plc, under the reference AEA/ED57281/Issue Number 17 of 10.08.2012.
50 A DG CLIMA study on the climate impact of potential shale gas production in the EU. This study was under-
taken by AEA Technology plc, under the reference AEA/ED57412/Issue 2 of 30 July 2012.
51 A JRC study on the potential impact of unconventional gas, in particular shale gas, on EU energy markets
published under the reference JRC 70481 – EUR 25305 EN, 2012.14
SHALE GAS IN EUROPE: MUCH ADO ABOUT LITTLE?shale gas developments in the US have led to greater LNG supplies becoming avail-
able at global level52, indirectly influencing EU gas prices. It also suggests that under
a best case scenario, taking into account environmental considerations, future shale
gas production in Europe would not make Europe self-sufficient in natural gas. It
would offset the decline in the European production of conventional natural gas and
would help this way the EU maintain its import dependence at a level around 60% of
its total energy needs. In a way or another through a different approach though,
these published studies confirm the Cornell Study and the 2011 ENVI study. The
fourth one53, prepared by JRC, aims at assessing whether the use of certain
substances for hydraulic fracturing of shale gas reservoirs has been registered under
REACH. The main outcome of the assessment is that neither hydraulic fracturing nor
shale gas was explicitly mentioned in the investigated dossiers. Hydraulic fracturing
of shale gas reservoirs was not identified as a specific use for any of the substances
and a dedicated Exposure Scenario was not developed by any registrant. 54 The fifth
one55, also prepared by JRC, provides an overview of shale gas development in the
USA and describes the implications of findings for the prospects for shale gas devel-
opment in the EU by 2020-2030. Particular emphasis is given to environmental and
social aspects of market-scale extraction of shale gas. The sixth one56 prepared by
Milieu’s Ltd’s Belgium Office and ordered by DG Environment of the European
Commission offers more details on the regulatory provisions governing key aspects
of unconventional gas extraction in selected EU countries.
Building on the above studies, the Commission included in its 2013 Work
Programme57 an “environmental, climate and Energy Assessment Framework to
enable safe and secure unconventional Hydrocarbon extraction” as new initiative
(subject to an impact Assessment).58 To prepare the impact assessment, the
Commission launched an on-line stakeholders’ consultation on unconventional fossil
fuels such as shale gas at the end of 2012. The results of the consultation and their
analysis are contained in an October 2013 report59 elaborated by DG Environment.
52 To know more about LNG market, see the International Gas Union’s world LNG report 2011, June 2012
(http://www.igu.org/igu-publications/LNG%20Report%202011.pdf) and The Economist’s special report
entitled “LNG a liquid market”, 14 July 2012.
53 Assessment of the use of substances in hydraulic fracturing of shale gas reservoirs under Reach published
under reference JRC 83512 – EUR 26069 EN, September 2013.
54 It should be noted that the oil and gas industries consider that REACH is not the mechanism to address pub-
lic disclosure concerns regarding the chemical constituents of hydraulic fracturing fluid and has launched its
own web-based European chemical disclosure platform for hydraulic fracturing fluids from shale gas extrac-
tion: NGS Hydraulic Fracturing Fluid and Additive Component Transparency Service.
55 Shale gas for Europe – Main environmental and social considerations – A literature review published under
reference JRC 74271 – EUR 25498 EN, 2012.
56 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/integration/energy/pdf/Final%20Report%2024072013.pdf.
57 Commission communication entitled “Commission work programme 2013” – COM (2012) 629, Vol. 1/2,
complemented by an Annex – COM (2012) 629, Vol. 2/2.
58 A roadmap accompanied this initiative (http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/planned_ia/docs/2013_
env_004_unconvential_hydrocarbon_extraction_en.pdf).
59 Analysis and presentation of the results of the public consultation “Unconventional fossil fuels (e.g. shale
gas) in Europe”, 3 October 2013, (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/integration/energy/pdf/Shale%
20gas%20consultation_report.pdf).15
SHALE GAS IN EUROPE: MUCH ADO ABOUT LITTLE?According to this report, opinions on unconventional fossil fuels diverge but
responses clearly showed a call for EU action. A large majority of respondents
however agree on a strong need for information, the lack of public acceptance and
the lack of a clear legal framework. The impact assessment60 was released by the
Commission on 22 January 2014 (see point 5.1)
To conclude, the European Commission appears in general positive towards the
exploitation of shale gas in the EU. The various studies appear more on the cautious
side, and so do the results of the public consultation.
3.2. The European Parliament
Reports on different aspects of shale gas were issued in 2012 by two Committees of
the European Parliament: the ITRE (Industry, Research and Energy Committee)61 and
the ENVI (Environment, Public Health and Food safety Committee)62. One can say
that both reports are favorable to shale gas development and even call for its devel-
opment. The ITRE report is generally unambiguous while the ENVI report has been
perceived quite hypocrite.
Both reports confirm that the risks are well-understood and can be effectively
managed with existing technology and best practices.
Neither report calls for new regulation. But both reports take the stance that further
screening is needed of both European and national law to assess their adequacy.
There is one exception however. The ENVI report urges the Commission to bring
forward legislative proposals to make the use of completion combustion devices
mandatory for all shale gas wells in the EU. Both reports also call for a “Best Available
Techniques Reference” document for hydraulic fracturing. Disclosure of chemicals
used in fracturing fluid is a key issue for both reports too, with the ITRE urging full
disclosure while ENVI calling for disclosure on a mandatory basis. Concerns over the
potential of shale gas development to damage water supplies through leakage from
wells can be addressed in the case of ITRE through the adoption of best practices in
well development and construction and through the adoption of water provision
plans for ENVI based on local hydrology. These two reports also want to ensure
participation of citizens and consider that the polluter-pays principle should be
applied.
60 SWD(2014) 16.
61 Report on industrial, energy and other aspects of shale gas and oil – Doc. 2011/2309(INI) dated 25.09.2012.
62 Report on the environmental impacts of shale gas and shale oil extraction activities – Doc. 2011/2308(INI)
dated 25.09.2012.16
SHALE GAS IN EUROPE: MUCH ADO ABOUT LITTLE?Still in 2012, the European Parliament adopted two non-committal resolutions63 on
shale gas drilling and hydraulic fracturing which call Member States to be cautious in
going further with unconventional fossil fuels and to implement all existing regula-
tions effectively. In both resolutions, the European Parliament does not reject the
method of extraction (hydraulic fracturing).
On 9 October 2013, following a vote to amend a European Commission proposal to
revise the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Directive, the European Parlia-
ment proposed that shale gas exploration and extraction projects involving hydraulic
fracturing be added to the list of projects for which an environmental impact assess-
ment must be undertaken before planning permission (or equivalent in Member
States).64 According to the European Parliament, this proposal could help mitigate
the absence of rejection of the hydraulic fracturing method.65 But almost two
months later, however, the European Parliament accepted to drop its proposal (see
point 5.2.).
3.3. The European Council
In February 2011, EU leaders concluded that there is a need to assess Europe’s
potential for sustainable extraction and use of unconventional fossil fuel resources,
including shale gas. At their Brussels Summit on 22 May 2013, they added that EU
energy policy must shift towards diversifying supply, with natural shale gas likely to
be part of the mix. In addition, at that occasion, UK Prime Minister David Cameron
brought strong support for European exploitation of shale gas, even telling journal-
ists: “No regulation must get in the way.” Emphasis on competitiveness and high
energy prices was also on the agenda, as well as the Green Paper on a 2030 frame-
work for climate and energy policies.
This said, the written conclusions66 of the European Council of 22 May 2013 remain
cautious. They do not explicitly mention shale gas. They shyly indicate that: “It
remains crucial to further intensify the diversification of Europe’s energy supply and
develop indigenous energy resources to ensure security of supply, reduce the EU’s
external energy dependency and stimulate growth.” And to that end, notably, “the
Commission intends to assess a more systematic recourse to on-shore and off-shore
63 European Parliament resolution of 21 November 2012 on the environmental impacts of shale gas and shale
oil extraction activities (2011/2308(INI)) and European Parliament resolution of 21 November 2012 indus-
trial, energy and other aspects of shale gas and oil (2011/2309(INI)).
64 See notably the previous ENVI report dated 22 July 2013 (A7-0277/2013), Amendment 31, p. 21 (http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2013-
0277+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN).
65 See European Parliament press release – Plenary Session – 9 October 2013.
66 European Council Conclusions of 22 May 2013 (doc. EUCO 75/1/13 REV 1; CO EUR 7; CONCL 5 of 23 May
2013). Full text of the amendments proposed by the European Parliament can be found on the following
website: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2013-
41317
SHALE GAS IN EUROPE: MUCH ADO ABOUT LITTLE?indigenous sources of energy with a view to their safe, sustainable and cost-effective
exploitation while respecting Member States’ choices of energy mix; ...”. They also
call for “the phasing out of environmentally or economically harmful subsidies,
including for fossil fuels;”. Such a call coming from Europe’s political leaders in the
European Council is noteworthy.18
§ 4. THE VARIOUS APPROACHES OF THE MEMBER 
STATES TO DEVELOPING SHALE GAS RESOURCES
Article 194 (2) TFUE states that Member States have sovereign rights regarding the
choice of energy mix. Issuing licenses and other approvals for the exploration and
exploitation of hydrocarbon resources is also a Member State prerogative. So all EU
Member States can decide whether they want or not to exploit shale gas as domestic
energy source, as long as they respect fully the obligations of the existing legal frame-
work.
On that basis, Member States’ attitude regarding shale gas varies a lot.67
Poland looks at shale gas in a very enthusiastic manner for three main reasons. First,
it deems that shale gas emits, referring to the US experience, 50% less GHG emissions
than other fossil fuels. Second, it sees shale gas as an opportunity for being less
dependent from external gas sources, i.e. Russia. Third, it takes less time to explore
and exploit shale gas than to build a nuclear power plant. About 110 shale gas explo-
ration concessions have been granted and up to now more than 45 wells have been
drilled with mixed results. Even if the results from some exploration wells have been
disappointing and has led to the exit of important players68, the rate of drilling is set
to increase the next years. Donald Tusk, Poland’s Prime Minister, has even projected
that commercial production of shale gas will take place late 2014/early 2015.
Nevertheless, an energy market report from Business Monitor International
published in December 201369 has deemed this schedule too optimistic. According to
the report, commercial production of shale gas in Poland will not occur before 2019.
Among the reasons invoked, a draft law whose adoption has been repeatedly
delayed. The changes which should be brought by this new law are related to: (1) the
role of the government in the supervision of the sector (creation of a 100% state-
owned operator, NOKE, to take stakes in future extraction concessions and a Hydro-
carbon Generation Fund which will make long-term investments; (2) exploration
concessions; and (3) procedures aiming at simplifying the assessment of the environ-
mental impact of the exploration and production of shale gas. Also among the
67 See for more on the subject, L. Parmigiani, Dynamics and drivers of shale gas development in three Euro-
pean countries: can a European policy be imagined?, Actuelles de l’IFRI, Novembre 2013. See also S. Cornot-
Gandolphe, Gaz de schiste en Pologne, au Royaume-Uni, et au Danemark: vers un modèle européen?, note
de l’IFRI, Janvier 2014.
68 For instance, US company ExxonMobil stopped all its exploratory tests because “no demonstrated sus-
tained commercial hydrocarbon flow rates” were observed. More recently, Talisman Energy and Marathon
Oil followed the same path after “unsuccessful attempts to find commercial levels of hydrocarbons”. Other
companies such as Poland’s PGNiG and US giant ConocoPhilips have decided to abandon some regions
because of difficult geological conditions.
69 Poland Oil & Gas Report Q1 2014, 20 December 2013, pp. 135, (http://www.fastmr.com/prod/759124_
poland_oil_gas_report_q1_2014.aspx?afid=302).19
SHALE GAS IN EUROPE: MUCH ADO ABOUT LITTLE?reasons invoked, a fiscal reform applicable to the production of unconventional
hydrocarbons.
Pushed by the rising tensions in Ukraine, progress has been made to accelerate shale
gas activities in Poland however. In March 2013, the Polish government adopted a
new draft legislation more attractive for investors. Tax on shale gas extraction will
not be imposed until 2020 and after 2020 tax will not exceed 40% of profit arising
from extraction. Plans to create a state-owned operator are given up. License proce-
dures will be simplified and accelerated.70 Put on fast track, the legislation could take
effect this year.
France, privileged by its choice for nuclear power, was the first country to ban the
use of hydraulic fracking with the “Jacob Law” adopted in July 201171. Article 2 of this
law foresaw however the creation of a “National Commission of Orientation” to eval-
uate the environmental issues involved in shale gas. This Commission was set up by
a 2012 Decree72 but the government has up to now refused to appoint 12 of 22
members whom it is supposed to appoint, so preventing its effective implementa-
tion. Since then, several reports in favour of shale gas were published and tried to
rekindle discussions but without meeting success.73 On 11 October 2013, the French
Constitutional Council rejected an appeal from Schuepbach Energy to strike down
the “Jacob Law” prohibiting fracking for shale gas. In its decision74, the French Consti-
tutional Council indicated that the Jacob Law “conforms to the Constitution” and is
not “disproportionate”. Schuepback Energy had won two permits, later cancelled, to
explore for shale gas in France. It is now seeking compensation from the French
government for a sum reported by French media to be € 1bn. So in France shale gas
remains a sensitive file and this file is far from being settled.
UK supports shale gas eagerly for several reasons. UK has given gas a significant role
to play in its energy mix (35%). However, due to a decline of its conventional gas
70 http://adoptanegotiator.org/2014/03/11/the-120-days-of-the-polish-cop-presidency/ and http://
www.gpwinfostrefa.pl/GPWIS2/en/index/news/info/578202,poland-gives-up-on-creating-noke-national-
mineables-operator--introduces-single-e&e-permit---cir.
71 Loi n° 2011-835 du 13 July 2011.
72 Décret n° 2012-385 du 21 mars 2012 relatif à la Commission nationale d’orientation, de suivi et d’évalua-
tion des techniques d’exploration et d’exploitation des hydrocarbures liquides et gazeux.
73 See notably a February 2012 expert study published in March 2012 by the French government entitled
« Shale hydrocarbons in France » clearly in favour of exploration and which recommended a focus on the
Paris Basin (http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/007612-01_et_007612-03_rap-
ports.pdf). See also the November 2012 Gallois report ordered by the government which proposed 22
measures to rebuild competitiveness in France. The fifth one was on shale gas. (http://www.gou-
vernement.fr/sites/default/files/fichiers_joints/rapport_de_louis_gallois_sur_la_competitivite_0.pdf).
Finally, see the June 2013 report requested by the Economic Affairs Committee of the French Senate enti-
tled “Les techniques alternatives à la fracturation hydraulique pour l’exploration et l’exploitation des hydro-
carbures non conventionnels, rapport n° 640 (2012-2013) de MM. Jean-Claude Lenoir, sénateur et Christian
Bataille, député, fait au nom de l’Office parlementaire d’évaluation des choix scientifiques et technologiqes,
déposé le 5 juin 2013 (http://www.senat.fr/rap/r12-640/r12-640.html).
74 Decision No 2013-346 QPC dated 11 October 2013 (http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitu-
tionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-par-date/decisions-depuis-1959/2013/2013-346-qpc/decision-n-2013-
346-qpc-du-11-octobre-2013.138283.html).20
SHALE GAS IN EUROPE: MUCH ADO ABOUT LITTLE?production, the country faces an increasing dependency towards gas imports75,
affecting its trade balance. Shale gas is thus seen there as an opportunity to reduce
dependence upon imported gas and improve its trade balance. It is also seen as a
means to maintain a traditional gas industry on its territory.76 In the UK, concerns
were raised following seismic activity near Cuadrilla’s drilling site in Blackpool in
April/May 2011. The UK halted exploratory fracking in May 2012 but in December of
the same year, the government authorized the resumption of the exploratory
hydraulic fracturing activities. Its view is that the risks are worth taking, though an
analysis from Bloomberg New Energy Finance77 suggests that the development of
shale gas resource in the UK is unlikely to lead to a significant reduction in UK natural
gas prices.78 The House of Commons (Energy and Climate Change Committee) in its
seventh report of session 2012-2013 is more cautious and concludes that substantial
uncertainty remain about the impact shale gas will have on gas prices.79
In July 2013, the UK government announced generous tax breaks to stimulate shale
gas industry and at the beginning of 2014 incentives to local communities to
encourage them to accept drilling in their area. In addition, to reassure the local
communities affected by fracking and which continue to protest strongly against
shale gas exploration, Public Health England issued end of October 2013 a report80
as a “draft for comment” for one month which reviews the literature on the potential
public health impacts of exposures to chemical and radioactive pollutants as a result
of shale gas extraction. According to this report, fracking for shale gas is safe as long
as operations are properly regulated and properly run. Most of the problems in the
US according to the report resulted from failures of the regulators and companies to
observe good practices. The report also finds that the contamination of groundwater
was “likely to be caused by leakage through the vertical borehole” used for fracking.
As a result, well integrity was identified as the key concern. However, the report was
unable to say whether current government regulations and the operations of the
UK’s only company to have fracked for shale gas met the criteria of being “properly
regulated and properly run” and whether potential problems with well integrity had
been addressed. Finally, the report examines some of the chemicals used at fracking
sites in the US but has not examined the effects of the main two chemicals (oxirane
and antimony trioxide) that Cuadrilla wants to use in the UK.81
75 Imports mainly come from Norway and the Netherlands via pipelines and from Qatar (LNG).
76 See S. Cornot-Gandolphe, op. cit., p.7.
77 http://about.bnef.com/press-releases/uk-shale-gas-no-get-out-of-jail-free-card/).
78 The same opinion is shared by P. Stevens, “Shale gas in the United Kingdom”, Chatham House, Energy, Envi-
ronment and Resources 2013/02, December 2013, p. 5 (http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/
public/Research/Energy,%20Environment%20and%20Development/131213shalegas.pdf).
79 See the Seventh report of Session 2012-2013 of the House of Commons (Energy and Climate Change Com-
mittee) entitled « The Impact of Shale Gas on Energy Markets », Vol. 1, 23 April 2013.
80 http://www.hpa.org.uk/webc/HPAwebFile/HPAweb_C/1317140158707.
81 In the UK, companies wishing to inject fluid containing pollutants into the ground may need a permit from
the Environment Agency. Permits are issued on a site-by-site basis, considering the proximity of the
groundwater. In the case of Cuandrilla, the UK Environment Agency banned antimony trioxide but granted
permission to oxirane despite concerns over its safety.21
SHALE GAS IN EUROPE: MUCH ADO ABOUT LITTLE?Germany has reservations about shale gas development. Shortly after the disaster of
Fukushima in 2011, Germany initiated an energy transition process (Energiewende).
All nuclear power plants will be shut down until 2022 and natural gas is regarded by
the country as an important transition energy source which could replace part of the
energy from nuclear power plants. But the decline of Germany’s natural gas produc-
tion has obliged Germany to rely mainly on imported pipelines gas (originating
mainly from Russia, Norway, the Netherlands). So, like in the UK, domestic shale gas
production is seen as an opportunity to lower this dependency. It is also seen as an
alternative source of stable and cleaner energy to complement intermittent renew-
ables. In December 2012, the German Parliament during its second consideration on
shale gas rejected calls for a ban on hydraulic fracturing. In late February 2013 the
German government issued draft legislation allowing the development of shale and
the use of hydraulic fracturing under environmental safeguards but, due to strong
political opposition, postponed its adoption until after the Federal elections on 22
September 2013. In the wake of these elections however the new coalition between
the CDU and the SPD agreed to keep a moratorium in place on hydraulic fracturing
until environmental concerns are resolved.
In Spain, the competence of exploration and development of shale gas is shared
between the autonomous communities and the central government depending
whether the permit crosses one or several regions. The central government has
repeatedly voiced its support for shale gas exploration. During an intervention in the
Senate in February 2013, the Minister of Industry, Energy and Tourism stated that
the government will pursue opportunities involving hydraulic fracturing as long as
they comply with environmental regulation and in March 2013 the Spanish parlia-
ment adopted a bill facilitating the use of the controversial method. In April 2013,
despite the lousy economic shape of the country, the autonomous community of
Cantabria passed a law to ban the use of hydraulic fracturing in the region where
Spain’s richest shale gas deposists lie. However Spain’s central government
announced in January 2014 it will file a legal challenge in the country’s Constitutional
Court against this fracking ban. With Spain importing more than 70% of its natural
gas needs, Cantabria seems too rich to be ignored.
Elsewhere in the EU, the approaches vary too. Here are a few examples. The Nether-
lands and Luxembourg have suspended drilling for shale gas. Bulgaria banned in 2012
shale oil and gas exploration through hydraulic fracturing following political and
public pressure. The Bulgarian government has stated that it will review its stand
once shale gas is being substantively discussed at EU level. On the other hand, the
Romanian authorities have reversed their decision of April 2012 to ban shale gas
exploration and have granted Chevron on 31 January 2013 the certificate it needed
to start exploring for shale gas in the eastern part of the country. But in this country,
protests against fracking are ongoing. The Czech Republic introduced a moratorium
on shale gas exploration. Shale gas exploration in the latter country is banned until22
SHALE GAS IN EUROPE: MUCH ADO ABOUT LITTLE?at least mid-2014 in view to allow the government to propose new legislation
covering unconventional hydrocarbon developments. Finally, Italy does not want to
develop shale gas. Instead, this country intends to strengthen its national infrastruc-
ture for gas storage and gasification in view of the large quantities of gas that are
going to be imported into the Continent of Europe in the future.23

§ 5. THE EMERGING EU FRAMEWORK
5.1. The 2014 shale gas recommendation
This debate on shale gas is taking place while the EU is seeking a new energy and
climate policy. It is thus connected to broader discussions related to the future EU
energy/climate framework for 2030. Here, the European Commission had a choice to
make between three options to minimize the risks stemming from shale gas activi-
ties: (1) offering “soft guidance” to the industry; (2) bringing amendments to existing
legislation; or (3) elaborating a standalone instrument such as a new directive appli-
cable across the EU.
On 22 January 2014, the European Commission presented its proposals and revealed
it had chosen option 1 with the issuance of a recommendation82, accompanied by a
communication83 and an impact assessment84. Two reasons have most probably
justified the choice of a recommendation. On the one hand, the pressure of big pro-
shale Member States (such as Poland and the UK) and the oil and gas industry. On the
other hand, the lack of experience in the area albeit a lot of studies have already been
ordered by the European Commission. A third reason could also be added. A too
precise text on operating standards would have had few chances to be adopted by
Member States because they are so much divided on the issue.
In this recommendation, it has been recognized that the current EU’s environmental
legislation was developed before the emergence of shale gas activities in Europe and
that certain aspects involving these activities are not comprehensively addressed.85
Consequently, the recommendation defines a series of common and minimum prin-
ciples and invites Member States to take them into account when applying or
adapting their regulations related to hydraulic fracturing. These principles covers a
certain number of issues such as (1) strategic environmental impact assessment prior
granting licenses in order to prevent, manage and mitigate cumulative impacts as
well as prevent possible conflicts with other uses of natural resources; (2) under-
ground risk assessment; (3) well integrity; (4) baseline reporting to provide a refer-
ence for subsequent monitoring; (5) capture of methane emissions (but no obliga-
tion for using “green completion like in the US”) as well as limitation of venting
(release of gases into the atmosphere) and minimization of flaring (controlled
burning of gases); (6) public disclosure of chemicals and volumes of water used in
82 Commission Recommendation 2014/70/EU of 22 January 2014 on minimum principles for the exploration
and production of hydrocarbons (such as shale gas) using high-volume hydraulic fracturing (OJ 2014, L 39/
72).
83 Communication from the Commission on the exploration and production of hyrocarbons (such as shale gas)
using high volume hydraulic fracturing in the EU – COM(2014) 23 final. This communication outlines the
potential new opportunities and challenges stemming from shale gas extraction in Europe.
84 SWD(2014) 15 final. The impact assessment examines the socio-economic and environmental impacts of
various policy options.
85 See Recital (8) of recommendation 2014/70/EU.25
SHALE GAS IN EUROPE: MUCH ADO ABOUT LITTLE?each well; and (7) application of best available techniques (BAT). They are expected
to be made effective by EU Member States by 28 July 2014.
The recommendation also includes a review clause to assess the effectiveness of this
approach. Depending on the results of the assessment, the Commission will decide
whether it is necessary to update the recommendation or to table legislative
proposals with legally-binding provisions. This could be seen as a smart tactical
approach to transfer the burden of this controversial topic to the next Commission.
5.2. The revision of the Environmental Impact Assessment 
Directive (EIA Directive)
Directive 2011/92/EU86 contains a legal requirement to carry out an environmental
impact assessment (EIA) of public or private projects likely to have significant effects
on the environment, prior to their authorization. The EIA is also a tool to assess the
environmental costs and benefits of specific projects with the aim of ensuring their
sustainability.
In 2012, the European Commission submitted a proposal to amend this Directive.87
This proposal is part of the initiatives aiming to implement the Roadmap to a
resource-efficient Europe88. It also subscribes to the Europe 2020 Strategy89. In that
context, in October 2013 as mentioned above, the European Parliament proposed
that all shale gas exploration and extraction projects involving hydraulic fracturing be
added to the list of projects for which an environmental impact assessment must be
undertaken before planning permission (or equivalent in Member States). This
proposal was justified by the fact that under the current EIA Directive an environ-
mental impact assessment is mandatory for projects falling within its Annex I.14, i.e.
extraction of natural gas where the amount of gas extracted exceeds 500 000 cubic
meters per day. However, many shale gas projects yield less and hence are not
subject to a mandatory impact assessment requirement. Instead, they are subject to
a screening procedure which takes place either on a case-by-case basis or through
thresholds or criteria decided by the Member State concerned.
In December 2013, a compromised agreement was reached, after a fourth round of
negotiations between the European Parliament, the Commission and the COREPER
(representing the 28 Member States). As a result, the European Parliament accepted
to drop its proposal to mandate environmental impact assessments for all shale gas
86 Directive 2011/92/EU (OJ L 26, 28.1.2012, p.1) codifies Directive 85/337/EEC and its three subsequent
amendments (Directives 97/11/EC, 2003/35/EC and 2009/31/EC).
87 COM (2012) 628 final.
88 COM (2011) 571.
89 COM (2010) 2020.26
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March 2014 plenary session. The Council of the European Union is expected to give
its endorsement over the coming weeks.
It is worth mentioning that the recommendation issued by the European Commission
reintroduces the requirement to submit shale gas projects to an environmental
impact assessment by inviting Member States to take “the necessary measures to
ensure that an environmental impact assessment is carried out on the basis of the
requirements of Directive 2011/92/EU”. The terms “on the basis of the requirements
of Directive 2011/92/EU” are ambiguous however. The EIA directive requires a
mandatory environmental impact assessment for shale gas projects that extract at
least 500 000 cubic metres each day. Hence, are shale gas projects below 500 000
cubic metres – which are the majority – covered?
90 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20140210IPR35522/html/Committee-
MEPs-back-beefed-up-environmental-impact-assessment-directive.27

CONCLUSION
The exploration and exploitation of shale gas as a new energy source has recently
emerged in the European debate. The EU institutions have worked a lot, and
produced quite little until now. Some Member States have given out licenses for the
exploration of such resources on their territory. Exploration wells have sometimes
been drilled and some hydraulic fracturing has already been carried out or will be in
the near future. Commercial production could start in 2015-2017 in the most
advanced Member States.
This new energy source has triggered high expectations. To measure its potentiali-
ties, one must take many parameters into consideration: additional growth, climate
change and the transition to a sustainable energy system; security of supply; environ-
ment and human health aspects; competitiveness of enterprises; jobs’ creation.
After many readings, these expectations appear clearly to have been raised too high.
 Shale gas could potentially bring benefits, although limited
In general, new energy resources are always welcome (except when they aggravate
climate warming). They can increase revenues, reduce prices, develop easily compet-
itiveness. However, in the present circumstances, the net benefits appear quite
limited. Firstly, Europe has less proven shale gas reserves. Secondly, geology places
it deeper in the ground, and it is more difficult and more expensive to reach. The
exploitation is thus technically and economically less advantageous than in the
United States. Thirdly, population density is generally higher in Europe, and thus the
potential collateral damages more threatening. This could generate greater regula-
tory protection, and thus more costs. Fourthly, in some areas, important additional
investments in infrastructure will be needed. Moreover, the competitiveness of
European shale gas will also depend on developments outside the EU (such as, for
instance, the possible rise of US exports of LNG). Revealingly, after asking for author-
izations, different operators have already retired from the Polish market. This must
be seen as a sign that, even with reserves and a favorable approach from the national
authorities, exploitation will certainly not be easy.
In the best case, the economic net benefits brought by shale gas will remain limited.
Even in the United States, where a lot of factors were more favorable, they are not
impressive. “The long-term effect on the US economy as a whole is small, in order of
a one-off rise in GDP of 0.84%. These are “one-off” effects because they do not
increase the annual growth rate of GDP. They are actually quite small in terms of long
run growth in the level of GDP. The short-term effects on GDP are slightly larger, but
are not lasting. These include a one-off boost from a decline in gas prices for residen-
tial consumers (estimated at 0.4% of GDP), a similar boost from increased investment29
SHALE GAS IN EUROPE: MUCH ADO ABOUT LITTLE?and employment in the oil and gas sector of around the same magnitude. These latter
effects have nevertheless been short term and are non-replicable effects in econo-
mies at full employment.91”
 Currently shale gas still raises fundamental questions regarding 
environment and health
These weak benefits could be weakened yet by the existing uncertainties
surrounding the externalities of environmental damage that may be associated with
shale gas operations. This should be accounted for in the “cost” which obviously
influences gas prices. In addition, without financial support, shale gas is unlikely to
be cheap enough to squeeze coal out in power generation as it has been done in the
US.
A pivotal question in that regard is whether shale gas in the EU can be extracted
presently under safe conditions, in particular in a context of greater population
density than in the US and in a context of absence of sufficient available data about
the level of methane emissions which represents a potentially significant addition to
greenhouse gas emissions?
Another pivotal question is related to the absence of debate at EU level concerning
water. There is more and more an interdependence between water resources and
energy needs. Water is needed notably for hydropower, to cool power plants, to
produce transportation biofuels and now to develop shale gas industry. This situa-
tion entails a growing impact on water availability for other activities and for drinking
water as well as raises water quality risks. All this happens in a context of climate
change which exacerbates the problem. It would be a mistake to take water
resources for granted.
 Whatever will happen with shale gas, the structural challenges remain the 
same
Finally, even in the best case of shale gas development, all present challenges will
remain. In that perspective, it must be remembered that shale gas does not consti-
tute a renewable energy. It is a fossil fuel. It does not help the climate by reducing
greenhouse gases if used without widespread cost effective CCS technology or with
other fossil fuels (such as coal).
Additionally, if shale gas has helped the US to cut its GHG emissions, it is because coal
that would have been burnt in the US has simply been shipped elsewhere for
burning, leading to more GHG emissions there (including Europe). This brings back
91 T. Spencer, O. Sartor, Mathilde Mathieu, Unconventional wisdom: an economic analysis of US shale gas and
implications for the EU, IDRI, Policy Brief, No 05/14 February 2014, p. 20.30
SHALE GAS IN EUROPE: MUCH ADO ABOUT LITTLE?into question shale gas’ role as a viable transition fuel. It only really works if the coal
to gas switch happens at a global scale and CCS become widespread (or coal mines
actually start to close).
Furthermore, even in the best case, shale gas will not free the EU from its external
dependency. It will have a short and limited influence on the domestic gas supply. It
will thus only compensate during a brief period the continuing decrease of natural
gas production in Europe. Finally, its competitiveness benefits will be far from those
of the United States.
So the final conclusion concerning the perspectives of shale gas exploitation in
Europe could be: (1°) both the economic and the sustainability aspects still require
more analysis, (2°) even in the best case, the benefits will be substantially more
limited than in the United States, where they are already modest, (3°) this exploita-
tion anyway will not happen quickly, and (4°) it is of the essence to keep on concen-
trating on the real solutions for the long term future. The real challenges and solu-
tions of the EU energy strategy are elsewhere.31

